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I 
THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr. 
* 
In this Article, we begin what we believe will be a fruitful area of 
scholarly inquiry: an in-depth analysis of credit derivatives. We 
survey the benefits and risks of credit derivatives, particularly as the 
use of these instruments affects the role of banks and other creditors 
in corporate governance. We also hope to create a framework for a 
more general scholarly discussion of credit derivatives. 
We define credit derivatives as financial instruments whose payoffs 
are linked in some way to a change in credit quality of an issuer or 
issuers. Our research suggests that there are two major categories of 
credit derivatlt'cs· credit defmtTt swaps and c()llateralized debt 
obligations. 
First, a credit default swap is a private contract in which private 
parties bet on a debt issuer's bankruptcy, default, or restructuring. 
For example, a bank that has loaned $10 million to a company might 
enter into a $10 million credit default swap with a third party for 
hedging purposes. If the company defaults on its debt, the bank will 
lose money on the loan but make money on the Sl'vap; conversely, if 
the company does not default, the bank will make a payment to the 
third party, reducing its profits on the loan. 
Second, a collateralized debt obligation (eDO) is a pool of debt 
contracts housed within a special purpose entity (SP E) whose capital 
structure is sliced and resold based on differences in credit quality. In 
a "cash flow" CD 0, the SPE purchases a portfolio of outstanding 
debt issued by a range of companies, and finances its purchase by 
issuing its own financial instruments, including primarily debt but 
also equity. In a "synthetic" CDO, the SPE does not purchase actual 
bonds, but instead enters into several credit default swaps with a third 
party, to create synthetic exposure to the outstanding debt issued by a 
range of companies. The SPE finances its purchase by issuing 
financial instruments to investors, but these instruments are backed by 
credit default swaps rather than any actual bonds. 
* Frank PamlOY is Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, and David A. 
Skeel is S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The 
authors are grateful to Adam Feibelman, Stephen Lubben, Bob Rasmussen, and Shaun P. Martin for 
helpful comments; to Yang Liu for excellent research assistance; and to the University of San Diego 
School of Law and the University of Pennsylvania Law School for generous summer funding. 
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In the Article's first substantive part, we discuss the benefits 
associated with both types of credit derivatives, which include 
increased opportunities for hedging, increased liquidity, reduced 
transaction costs, and a deeper and potentially more efficient market 
for trading credit risk. We then discuss the risks associated with 
credit derivatives, such as moral hazard and other incentive problems, 
limited disclosure, potential systemic risk, high transaction costs, and 
the mispricing of credit. After considering the benefits and risks, we 
discuss some of the implications of our findings, and make some 
preliminary recommendations. In particular, we focus on the issues 
of disclosure, regulatory licenses associated with credit ratings, and 
the special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, the transfer and pricing of credit was straightforward. 
The typical credit relationship was between an individual or corporate 
manager and the lending officer of a bank, and the typical credit 
instrument was a loan. Lawyers for the parties looked to standardized 
loan documentation in their negotiations, and the interaction of 
borrowers and lenders determined material terms, such as covenants, 
amortization schedules, and interest rates. Individuals, small businesses, 
and large public corporations used credit instruments that were virtually 
identical in form and substance. 
Today, these practices continue for many individuals and small 
businesses. But for most public companies, the credit markets are no 
longer so simple. The typical credit relationship today is between 
sophisticated risk managers. Companies still obtain funds through 
"plain vanilla" securities issues and loans, but increasingly tum to 
hybrid instruments and derivatives in their fmancings. 
Financial intermediaries, particularly banks, no longer necessarily 
serve as monitors and risk bearers. Instead, intermediaries use new 
instruments known as credit derivatives to shift risks to other parties. In 
this Article, we assess the benefits and costs associated with this 
disintermediation. 
Credit derivatives play an increasingly important and controversial 
role in financial markets. Commentators have labeled credit derivatives 
as either good or evil: some have lauded them for enabling banks to 
hedge credit risks while others have warned of hidden dangers and 
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systemic risks.l Institutions have both saved and lost fortunes usmg 
credit derivatives? Meanwhile, the market for credit derivatives has 
grown from virtually nothing a decade ago to the range of $20 trillion of 
notional value in 2006.3 The market for credit derivatives is now one of 
the largest markets in the world. 
Yet the academic literature has largely ignored these. instruments. In 
this Article, we begin what we believe will be a fruitful area of scholarly 
inquiry: an in-depth analysis of credit derivatives. We survey the 
benefits and risks of credit derivatives, particularly as the use of these 
instruments affects the role of banks and other creditors in corporate 
governance. We also hope to create a framework for a more general 
scholarly discussion of credit derivatives. 
We defme credit derivatives as fmancial instruments whose payoffs 
are linked in some way to a change in credit quality of an issuer or 
issuers. Our research suggests that credit derivatives fall into two major 
categories: credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations. We 
analyze each type separately. 
First, a credit default swap is a private contract in which private 
parties bet on a debt issuer's bankruptcy, default, or restructuring. For 
example, a bank that has loaned $10 million to a company might enter 
into a $10 million credit default swap with a third party for hedging 
purposes. If the company defaults on its debt, the bank will lose money 
1. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Chairman Fed. Reserve, Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan 
Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Nov. 19,2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bo 
arddocs/Speeches/2002/20021119/default.htm (concluding that credit derivatives "appear to have 
effectively spread losses from defaults by Enron, Global Crossing, Railtrack, WorldCom and 
Swissair . . .  over the past year ... from banks, which have largely short-term leverage, to insurance 
firms, pension funds, or others"); Warren Buffett, Letter to Berkshire Hathaway 
Shareholders, at 12, 14 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.comlletters/2002pdf . 
(warning of the dangers of credit derivatives, and calling derivatives "time bombs" and "financial 
weapons of mass destruction"); Water to Wine: Collaterised Debt Obligations, Report 2002 (Benefield 
Group Ltd.), Dec. 2002, at 3, available at http://www.benfieldgroup.comINRirdonlyresI3E2072E2-9455-
4186-B843-29056C4EA54B/OlWtWCD02002.pdf (Howard Davies, the outgoing head of Britain's 
Financial Services Authority, remarking that an investment banker had called synthetic collateralized 
default obligations "the most toxic element of the financial markets';. 
2. Banks used credit derivatives to hedge approximately $8 billion of risk associated with Enron 
debt and $10 billion of risk associated with WorldCom debt, thus avoiding massive losses when those 
two companies defaulted. Conversely, numerous companies have announced substantial losses on credit 
derivatives. See, e.g. , FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED : How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKET 390-91 (Times Books 2003) (describing American Express's $826 million loss on 
CDOs). 
3. See, e.g. , International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Summaries of Market 
Survey Results, http://www.isda.org (follow "Surveys and Market Statistics" hyperlink; then follow 
"Summaries of Market Survey Results" hyperlink) (last visited May 15, 2007) (noting that "[ c ]redit 
.... default swaps grew 38 percent from $12.4 trillion to $17.1 trillion"). Collaterized Debt Obligations also 
. are a multi-trillion dollar market. 
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on the loan, but make money on the swap; conversely, if the company 
does not default, the bank will make a payment to the third party, 
reducing its profits on the loan. Like other derivatives, credit default 
swaps can be used not only for hedging, but also for speculation or 
arbitrage. Credit default swaps have grown from a small private market 
in the early 1990s4 to a liquid, standardized market today. 
Second, a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a pool of debt 
contracts housed within a special purpose entity (SPE)5whose capital 
structure is sliced and resold based on differences in credit quality. In a 
"cash flow" CDO, the SPE purchases a portfolio of outstanding debt 
issued by a range of companies, and finances its purchase by issuing its 
own financial instruments, including primarily debt but also equity. 
Credit rating agencies rate the various tranches of the SPE's debt, whose 
terms vary depending on seniority. In a "synthetic" CDO, the SPE does 
not purchase actual bonds, but instead typically enters into several credit 
default swaps with a third party or parties to create synthetic exposure to 
the outstanding debt issued by a range of companies. The SPE then 
issues financial instruments, which are backed by credit default swaps 
rather than any actual bonds. 
In Part II, we discuss the benefits associated with both types of credit 
derivatives, which include increased opportunities for hedging, 
increased liquidity, reduced transaction costs, and a deeper and 
potentially more efficient market for trading credit risk. In Part III, we 
discuss the risks associated with credit derivatives, such as moral hazard 
and other incentive problems, limited disclosure, potential systemic risk, 
high transaction costs, and the mispricing of credit. In Part IV, we 
discuss some of the implications of our findings, and make some 
preliminary recommendations. In particular, we focus on the issues of 
disclosure, regulatory licenses associated with credit ratings, and the . 
special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy. 
II. THE BRlGHT SIDE OF CREDIT DERlV ATIVES 
It is no accident that the growth of the credit derivatives markets has 
been exponential since the market emerged roughly two decades ago. 
Credit derivatives offer a wide range of benefits for the banks that lend 
to large corporate borrowers, for companies that wish to issue bonds, 
4. Mark Parsley, You A in't Seen Nothing Yet-Slice of Credit Curve Anyone? A Portfolio 
Approach to Credit Risk Will Boost Liquidity and Refine the Use of Capital, Thanks to New Modeling 
Techniques, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1 997, at 70, 72. 
5. The SPE can be a trust, company, or other legal entity, and typically is domiciled within a tax 
or regulatory haven. 
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and other market partIcIpants. In this Part, we outline the major 
benefits. We start with credit default swaps, and then turn to CDOs. 
A. The New Vistas Opened by Credit Default Swaps 
In his final years as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan 
Greenspan waxed eloquently about the virtues of credit derivatives in 
general, and credit default swaps in particular. They are essential to the 
stability and flexibility of the American economy, he argued.6 The most 
obvious reason is that credit default swaps provide a simple device for 
banks and others to hedge the risks associated with a particular company 
or group of companies. We begin this section by considering hedging 
benefits, the most familiar virtue of credit default swaps. We then 
outline several additional benefits, including increased liquidity in the 
credit markets, contractual standardization, and the valuable signals 
provided by credit derivatives for other market participants. 
1. Using Credit Defaults to Hedge Risk 
Imagine a bank that has agreed to lend several hundred million dollars 
to a large corporate borrower such as General Motors. If the bank 
wishes to reduce its exposure, one option is to syndicate the loan so that 
the bank provides only a portion of the funds. This, of course, is a 
strategy that banks regularly use. But negotiating the syndication and 
working with a group of other banks introduces significant new costs, 
and also requires the bank to share the benefits of a potentially profitable 
lending relationship. If the bank would rather oversee the loan itself (or 
minimize the size of its syndicate), credit default swaps provide an 
alternative method for laying off some of the risk. By purchasing credit 
default swaps, the bank can handle the loan and lending relationship 
itself, and reduce the potential downside costs of a default by the 
borrower. 
6. "Two years ago at this conference," he recalled at a 2005 conference at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, "1 argued that the growing array of derivatives and the related application of more­
sophisticated [sic] methods for measuring and managing risks had been key factors underlying the 
remarkable resilience of the banking system, which had recently shrugged off severe shocks to the 
economy and the financial system." Alan Greenspan, Chairman Fed. Reserve, Risk Transfer and 
Financial Stability: Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan to the Federal Reserve B ank of Chicago's 
�orty-first Annual Conference on . Bank Structure (May· 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.govlBoarddocs/SpeechesI2005120050505/default.htrn. Greenspan also noted 
some of the risks of credit derivatives, many of which are discussed infra Part III. 
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Not only can credit default swaps be used to meter the lender's 
exposure to a particular borrower, they also can be combined with multi­
issuer swaps or other derivatives to create almost any desired risk 
profile. If the lender wishes to bear a borrower's finn specific default 
risk, but not risk related to the industry as a whole, for instance, the 
lender could purchase derivatives that would compensate the lender in 
the event of an industry downturn (such as a derivative linked to the 
stock prices of a broad group of companies in the industry). 
. 
If numerous banks in numerous lending relationships use these 
techniques, system-wide benefits will result. Alan Greenspan and others 
have argued that credit derivatives served as a shock absorber during the 
corporate crises of 200 1 and 2002. Because many of the lenders to 
companies like Enron and W orldCom had hedged their risk, the 
corporate scandals did not spread to the banking industry. By limiting 
their exposure, banks averted what could have been a parallel wave of 
banking failures.7 These systemic benefits are so important, in 
Greenspan's view, that Congress should eschew regulation so that the 
market will remain unfettered and continue to grow. "[T]he history of 
the development of these [credit derivative] products," as he put it, 
"encourages confidence that many of the newer products will be 
successfully embraced by the markets."s 
Others have suggested that the hedging opportunities afforded by 
credit derivatives and other risk management techniques are 
transforming the banking industry. Banks have begun shedding ordinary 
risks such as interest rate risk in order to focus on more complex, 
borrower-specific risk that they have a particular advantage in assessing 
and monitoring.9 This trend, too, could bring important benefits, such as 
more focused monitoring of corporate borrowers. 
2. Liquidity and Access to Capital 
Because credit default swaps enable banks to lend at lower risk, these 
contracts increase liquidity in the banking industry. The effect is 
analogous to the influence securitization has had on home mortgage 
lending. In the three decades since Fannie Mae first began purchasing 
7. See Greenspan, supra note 1. 
8. Greenspan, supra note 6, at 8. 
9. See. eg. Raghuram G. Raj an, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, 
Address at Symposium Sponsored by the Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Sept. 2005), available at 
www.kc.frb.orgiPUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2005/pdf/rajan.paper.OS04.pdf. We offer a related but 
somewhat different assessment of the implications of credit derivatives for the banking industry in our 
Conclusion. See infra Part V. 
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mortgages from banks, and selling interests in portfolios of mortgages, 
mortgage lending has soared.10 The ability to sell a mortgage after the 
bank makes a loan sharply reduces a bank's risk, which encourages 
banks to make more loans. 
Credit default swaps have had a similar effect on bank len_ding to 
businesses. Because swaps limit the bank's downside risk (and pass it 
on to other parties, such as insurance companies and pension funds), 
banks are willing to lend much more money to many more businesses. 
Credit default swaps thus significantly expand companies' access to 
capital from bank lending. II 
3. The Benefits of Standardization 
A third virtue of credit default swaps, as compared to traditional 
financial contracts, stems from the newness of the market and the way 
that it has emerged. If the terms of each credit default swap agreement 
were negotiated from scratch, credit default swaps could be quite costly. 
But they aren't. Because the credit default swap market is dominated by 
a discrete number of banks, and due to the efforts of a trade group--the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, or ISDA---credit 
default agreements have become standardized.12 This standardization 
reduces the transactions costs of credit default swap deals, and provides 
the other familiar benefits of standardization.13 At the same time, the 
active involvement of ISDA, due in no small part to the industry'S desire 
to demonstrate that legislative intervention is unnecessary, suggests that 
these contracts might not become as ossified and impervious to change 
10. In its own brief description of the history of its role in mortgage backed securities, Fannie 
Mae states that "[0 ]ur credit guaranty business, launched in 1981, helps lenders to package mortgages 
into mortgage-backed securities, and ensures their credit quality. This enhances the marketability of the 
securities, allowing lenders to sell the mortgages they originate more easily and replenish their funds to 
lend." Fannie Mae, Corporate Fact Sheet, http://www.fanniemae.comimediaJforrnediaJ 
factsheet.jhtml?p=Media&s=For+the+Media&t=Corporate+Fact+Sheet (last visited Oct. 10,2006). 
11. See generally Risky Business-Credit Derivatives, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 56 (noting 
that credit derivatives facilitate "the unbundling of financial risks" and have "been healthy for the 
banking system"). 
12. The ISDA website is www. isda.org. The website provides, among other things, a model 
credit swap agreement, the ISDA Master Agreement. The website also includes a "matrix" of standard 
provisions in the ISDA Credit Derivatives Physical Settlement Matrix. As discussed further, infra at 
Part III(A)(3), ISDA has resisted disclosure of any of the details of actual transactions. 
13. Classic accounts of standardization in the contracts literature include Marcel Kahan & 
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "the Economics of 
Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded 
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 
261 (1985). 
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as other financial contracts often appear to be. 14 
The industry's response to complaints about the huge backlog of 
unconfirmed trades, as well as other infrastructure problems in the 
swaps market, illustrates some of the benefits of this motivated self­
regulation. In 2005, Gerald Corrigan of Goldman Sachs, a former 
president of the New York Federal Reserve,. oversaw an industry report 
that proposed dozens of changes to the handling of credit derivative 
trades. In response to the report, the leading derivatives firms 
(affectionately or, to some, ominously known as the "Fourteen 
Families") agreed, among other things, to notify one another when one 
party sells its position to someone else, and to clean up the trade 
confirmation backlog. IS 
Seen in their most favorable light, then, the major players in the credit 
default swap market have steered between the Scylla of uncoordinated 
contracting and the Charybdis of excessive standardization. Credit 
default agreements are quite standardized in many respects, but the 
market is also subject to intensive, ongoing scrutiny by ISDA and the 
principal derivatives firms. This ongoing oversight has reduced the 
costs of contracting, and it has further spurred the growth of a market 
that is already remarkably broad and deep. 
4. Market Information About Credit Risk 
A final benefit of credit default swaps is their informational value to 
other market participants. To the extent the pricing of credit default 
swaps is disclosed or available to the market, it provides an additional 
source of market-based information about a company's financial 
health. 16 In recent decades, the most widely followed barometer of 
corporate (and often, sovereign) stability has been the credit ratings 
published by rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's (S&P) and 
Moody's. Despite their enormous importance to the markets, the ratings 
14. For theoretical and empirical analysis of the stickiness (and recent change) of boilerplate in 
sovereign debt contracts, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53.EMORY LJ. 929 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, The Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts, in DEBT RESTRUCTIJRING AND SOVEREIGN 
BANKRUPTCY (Jose Ocampo & Joseph Stiglitz eds., forthcoming 2007). 
1 5. See, e. g, David Wessel, Wall Street is Cleaning Derivatives Mess, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 
2006, at A2. 
16. As will become clear in Part III, disclosure is both a virtue and a problem in the current credit 
swaps market. The information that is available to the markets, such as the current price of a swap, is a 
valuable signal of creditworthiness. But ISDA and the principal ·market makers have restricted access to 
key information about the parties' contracts. 
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are notoriously flawed.17 Like the yield spreads of corporate bonds, 
credit default swap pricing may produce better and more timely 
information about the companies for whom a credit default swap market 
develops. 18 The price of credit default swap transactions thus can -
perform a valuable signaling function. 
B. The Benefits of CD Os 
As noted in the introduction, CDOs are structured, leveraged 
transactions backed by one or more classes of fixed income assets.19 
During the mid-1990s, CDOs typically were based on portfolios of high­
yield corporate bonds. More recently, CDOs have been based on other 
assets, including asset backed securities, credit default swaps, and even 
other CDOs.20 In this section, we discuss several of the apparent 
benefits of CDOs. 
1. Using Financial Engineering to Complete Markets 
CDOs arguably generate investment opportunities that otherwise 
would not be available. In this sense, they "complete" the markets for 
fixed income securities. In a standard cash flow CDO, a financial 
institution sells debt (loans or bonds) to a Special Purpose Entity (SPE), 
which then splits the debt into pieces by issuing new securities linked to 
each piece. Some of the pieces are of higher quality; some are of lower 
quality. The credit rating agencies give investment-grade ratings to 
most or all of the tranches, with the exception of the most junior 
17. One of us has detailed the shortcomings of rating agency oversight in other work. See, e.g., 
Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL 
GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59 (Barry Bosworth & Robert Litan eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers]; Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial 
Markets?: Two Thumbs Downfor the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999). 
18. For discussion of a proposal that credit spreads be used in the rating process, see Partnoy, Not 
Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 51-54 (assessing benefits as well as objections that have been 
raised). 
19. See Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria, STRUCTURED FINANCE (Standard & 
Poors), Mar. 21,2002, at 1, 4, available athttp://www2. standardandpoors.comlspf/pd£.fixedincome/ 
cdo_criteria2002_FINALTOC.pdf [hereinafter Synthetic CDO CYiteria]; see generally JANET 
TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND STRUCTURED FINANCE: NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
IN CASH AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION (2003). 
20. Recently, the CDO markets have experienced some difficulties. In April and May 2005, 
market participants were surprised when equity tranches of CDOs suddenly became much cheaper, 
while mezzanine tranches became more expensive. Likewise, CDOs obviously performed poorly after 
the increase in corporate defaults during 2002. In 2003, S&P and Moody's downgraded 150 cashflow 
CDO transactions;-108 more than in 2001. See Anthony Currie, Cool Heads Rule in CDO Land, 
EUROMONEY, Apr. 2003, at 114. 
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"equity" tranche. Payments to each tranche are governed by stipulated 
priorities. The use of SPEs to complete markets in the CDO context is 
similar to the use of SPEs more generally in the context of securitization 
of financial assets.21 
As noted above, there are two broad categories of CDOs that are 
relevant to this discussion: cash flow CDOs and synthetic CDOs. Cash 
flow CDOs involve the actual purchase of real fixed income assets 
whose cash flows are used to pay investors in the different tranches. 
Synthetic CDOs bundle the same kinds of credit risk exposure without 
real assets, by selling protection on the underlying assets using CDSs. 
Because investments in cash flow CDOs often have credit ratings that 
are higher than the ratings of the underlying bonds, they provide a new 
opportunity for investors. For example, some investors might not be 
able to buy the underlying bonds, given their relatively low credit 
ratings. Other investors might be able to buy the underlying bonds but 
would have to pay high capital charges due to regulations that depend on 
credit ratings. Thus, a cash flow CDO presents a new investment 
opportunity at potentially lower cost. 
One argument about how such arbitrage arises is that real value is 
created during the CDO process, either because the underlying assets are 
mispriced initially or because market segmentation otherwise prevents 
parties from buying the types of portfolios that CDOs create. For 
example, if regulatory requirements prevent many investors from 
holding sub-investment grade bonds, one might increase the demand for 
these bonds by repackaging them in a way that permitted these investors 
to hold them. 
Because synthetic CDOs-in contrast to cash flow CDOs­
essentially create new instruments instead of using assets already on 
bank balance sheets, they are not motivated by regulatory arbitrage, but 
instead complete markets by providing new financial instruments at 
lower prices.22 Synthetic CDOs are regarded as "pure" arbitrage 
21. For discussion of the uses of securitization, see, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: 
S TRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET P OOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED S ECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 
1994); SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H. P. Kravitt ed., 1991); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, 
STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE To THE P RINCIPLES OF ASSET S ECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993); 
Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1997). 
22. In other words, the rationale for synthetic COOs cannot be for a bank to offload its loans for 
regulatory purposes because the bank does not actually offload any loans in a Synthetic COO (the 
transaction uses credit default swaps instead of loans). See Synthetic CDO Criteria, supra note 19, at 5; 
see also Criteriafor Rating Synthetic CDO Transactions, STRUCTURED FINANCE RAT1NGS (Standard & 
Poor's), Sept. 2003, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.comlspf/pdf/fixedincome/ 
criteriaforratingsyntheticcdotransactionsR.pdf [hereinafter Criteria for Rating]. In other words, banks 
must have some rationale for doing synthetic COOs other than the rationale of reducing the capital 
charges associated with their loans. 
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opportunities, because their tranches typically are priced at higher yields 
relative to other similarly rated fixed income investments. Indeed, 
synthetic CDO tranches are popular because they offer investors a less 
expensive way of participating in the bond market, particularly -the 
market for high yield debt. 
2. Taking Advantage of Mathematical Finance 
It is worth considering precisely how such CDO arbitrage 
opportunities have arisen. According to S&P, "rating agencies played 
an important role in the development of the market since they were able 
to develop criteria to size default risk based on ratings of the underlying 
obligors.
,,23 In other words, the rating agencies have developed 
methodologies for rating CDOs that result in the combination of the 
tranches being worth more than the cost of the underlying assets. The 
difference between the price investors in aggregate pay for CDO 
tranches and the cost of the underlying assets must be substantial 
because it covers the high fees the various participants charge for 
structuring and arranging a CDO and for managing the underlying 
assets. 
We examined S&P's CDO rating methodology, which is said to 
generate value by applying principles of mathematical [mance to the 
evaluation of CDO tranches .. According to S&P, it uses a proprietary 
model called CDO Evaluator, which simulates the loss distribution and 
time to default of the assets in the underlying portfolio using random 
"Monte Carlo" methods and determines if in any of the simulations a 
loss trigger is breached. During the late 1990s, both S&P and Moody's 
developed early versions of such models with the close cooperation of 
the investment banks that created CDOs. S&P released the first version 
of CDO Evaluator in November 2001 and has released several updated 
versions since then.24 
Once a client has signed an engagement letter, S&P and the client use 
CDO Evaluator to run simulations to establish the default level of each 
proposed pool of assets at each rating level. The model uses default 
estimates based on the existing ratings of the assets. For example, for a 
tranche to be rated AAA, S&P might require that it be able to withstand 
a default rate of 30% of the asset pooI for a particular period of time, 
assuming a level of defaults based on the ratings of those assets. The 
23. See Synthetic CDO Criteria, supra note 19, at 13 .. 
'-24. More detailed information about CDO Evaluator is available at Standard & Poor's, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com. 
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default rate for lower credit ratings would be correspondingly higher. 
The model also incorporates assumptions about how much of the face 
value might be recovered after a default. 
The rating agency and client evaluate the tranches of a CDO using a 
mathematical algorithm. First, they calculate the expected cash flows of 
the underlying assets over time. Then they determine how those cash 
flows would be paid out to each tranche over time. The equity, or most 
junior, tranche absorbs losses up to the fIrst "attachment point." Then 
the most junior mezzanine tranche absorbs losses up to the next 
attachment point, and so on. The rating agencies then give a credit 
rating to each of the tranches (but usually not to the junior tranche) 
based on assumptions about certain key variables, including expected 
default rates, recovery rates, and correlation rates among assets. 
This process employs sophisticated mathematical techniques. For 
example, a rating agency might run 100,000 computer simulations to 
determine the number of times a breach would occur, that is, how often 
a particular tranche would lose value beyond a specified leveL The 
variable in this assessment is the number of breaches out of the 100,000 
runs, not the magnitude of the breach or any qualitative analysis of the 
breach. For example, for a typical fIve-year synthetic CDO, S&P might 
establish a confidence interval for the AAA level of 0.284%, meaning 
that the particular tranche would be "breached" in 284 runs out of 
100,000. 
One argument in favor of CDOs is that this mathematical 
sophistication leads to the production of new, higher value financial 
instruments. As this argument goes, CDO technology resembles other 
mathematical insights in finance, such as the Black-Scholes option 
pricing model, which generated value by enabling investors to price 
securities more accurately, and by creating new instruments that 
investors could use for a variety of beneficial purposes. 
3. Providing New Diversification Opportunities 
Finally, CDOs arguably provide benefits to investors by permitting 
them to purchase diversified portfolios of fixed income instruments. A 
CDO is like a firm, in that a manager is empowered by shareholders to 
engage in certain activities. In this case, the manager selects a portfolio 
of bonds. As the argument goes, investors benefit from the manager's 
expertise, and from the fact that they can pool resources with other 
investors to obtain a divided ownership interest in a diverse portfolio of 
bonds. 
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The diversification value created by a CDO is parceled out among the 
various participants: the buyers of the highly-rated pieces are paid a 
higher yield than comparably rated bonds, the banks arranging the CDO 
receive a fee, and the buyer of the "junior" piece has access to a new 
kind of investment, which otherwise was not available in the markets: a 
highly-leveraged position in corporate bonds. Essentially, the "junior" 
piece borrows money from the "senior" pieces to invest in a diversified 
portfolio of debt. Although the junior piece is risky and volatile, it also 
has the potential for high returns. 
A synthetic CDO offers further diversification by enabling investors 
to invest in a diversified portfolio of credit default swaps. Although 
synthetic CDO fees are relatively high, as the technology becomes more 
standardized, the costs associated with the structuring process should 
decline. Thus, synthetic CDOs should begin to resemble indices of 
credit default swaps, such as the Dow Jones iTraxx, which offers 
investors a fmancial instrument based on the performance of a range of 
credit default swaps.25 Both of these instruments offer investors a new 
way of obtaining diversified exposure to fixed income markets. 
Interestingly, these two types of credit derivatives-synthetic CDOs 
and credit default swap-based indices-appear to be converging in some 
ways. One open question is whether more value is"created through the 
process of securitizing fixed income claims using synthetic CDOs or the 
process of creating indexed investments based on credit default swaps. 
In terms of more established markets, the synthetic CDO is analogous 
to a mutual fund, whereas the index of credit default swaps is analogous 
to an exchange traded fund (ETF). In other words, investors in a 
synthetic CDO, like investors in a mutual fund, pay money for the rights 
to the cash flows associated with underlying assets. Those assets might 
be fixed, as in a closed end fund, or variable, as in an actively managed 
open end fund. In contrast, the credit default swap index is more like a 
commodity product, such as an ETF or even an index fund, whose value 
is calculated by reference to some other underlying asset. If this parallel 
to other markets is correct, the future of the credit default swap index 
might be more promising than that of the synthetic CDO, primarily 
because of reduced transaction costs. In other words, just as ETFs and 
index funds have become more popular because of their low cost, credit 
derivatives indices might become a preferred way for investors to get 
exposure to credit derivatives without the relatively high fees associated 
with individual transactions. 
'--25. The International Index Company manages and administers the various iTraxx credit 
deriv�tive indices. Seehttp://www.itraxx.com. 
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III. THE DARK SIDE OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
In the previous Part, we saw the upside of credit derivatives. This 
new market offers a world of promise, both for enhancing the liquidity 
and informational quality of the credit markets generally, and for 
facilitating governance by banks and other creditors in particular. We 
tum now to the dark side of credit derivatives. The same innovations 
that offer so many remarkable benefits also can undermine the amount 
or quality of monitoring and oversight, can magnify rather than 
constrain systemic risk, and can create other problems as well. This Part 
outlines the perils and limitations of the market for credit derivatives. 
As in Part II, we begin with credit default swaps, then tum to CDOs. 
A. Potential Problems with Credit Default Swaps 
1. Reducing the Incentives for Banks to Monitor 
In the standard account of banks' role in corporate governance, 
particularly as the borrower's fortunes deteriorate, banks are the 
muscular superheroes who step in and take charge to right the troubled 
ship. They might insist that board members resign or that the company 
bring in a new chief restructuring officer, and if the company does file 
for bankruptcy they might use their loan agreement and their ability to 
meter the company's access to cash to dictate the course of the 
restructuring process.26 Banks do often play this role, but the fact that a 
group of banks has made major loans to a troubled company does not 
always mean that the banks have an incentive to actively monitor the 
company.27 
Enron seems to have been an illustration. JP Morgan Chase, 
Citigroup, and several other banks had lent billions of dollars to Enron, 
but they appeared to have provided very little oversight, either while 
26. Bank governance of small and medium-sized businesses is well known and is the subject of 
extensive analysis in the academic literature, often as part of the debate over the efficiency (or not) of 
secured credit. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory oj Secured FinanCing, 86 COLUM. L. 
REv. 90 I (J 986) (classic early argument that bank acts somewhat like a joint venturer with a business it 
finances). Only recently has banks' role in the governance of large corporations become a subject of 
sustained attention. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever oJ Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209 (2006); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: 
The 'New' New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 917 (2003); George G. 
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role oj Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 
1073 (1995). 
27. Stephen Lubben makes a similar point in an article written shortly after this one. Stephen 1. 
Lubben, Credit Derivatives & The Future oj Chapter J J, 32-33 (Seton Hall Pub. L., Research Paper No. 
906613,2006), available at http://papers.ssm. com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=906613. 
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Enron was thought to be healthy or after its fortunes began to 
deteriorate. There no doubt were many reasons that the banks were 
missing in action, but surely one of them was credit derivatives. The 
banks that financed Enron had used massive amounts of credit 
derivatives to limit their exposure in the event Enron defaulted-by one 
estimate, they used more than 800 swaps to layoff $8 billion· of Enron 
risk. 28 The banks would have preferred that Enron survive, even after 
buying all this protection. After all, a healthy Enron meant the ability to 
keep making loans to Enron and to continue pocketing fees. But the 
prospect of Enron's decline meant much less to Enron's banks than if 
their loans were fully exposed. 
The phenomenon is familiar in business life. Bank managers may 
sleep better at night if they hedge their nine- or ten-digit exposure to a 
company like Enron, just as the managers of well-diversified 
conglomerates slept well in the 1960s. But the protection dulls their 
incentive to actively monitor. And since banks are often particularly 
well-positioned to monitor-due, among other things, - to their 
sophistication and the access they have to the details of a debtor's 
[mances-the use of credit default swaps can neutralize a very good 
monitor. There may be offsetting benefits when a bank hedges its risk, 
of course, as we saw in the previous Part. But lenders' access to credit 
default swaps complicates the assumption that a significant bank 
presence invariably translates to active oversight of the borrower. 
In theory, the counter-parties to a credit default swap could take up 
the slack, assuming the banks' monitoring role along with their credit 
risk exposure. Hedge funds that sell credit derivative protection may 
emerge, in time, as active monitors of the companies that are the subject 
of credit derivative contracts.29 But the pension funds and insurance 
companies that take on much of the risk are unlikely to provide 
meaningful monitoring. Unlike banks, they have no relationship with 
the borrower and are less skilled and experienced in evaluating risk. 
Overall this situation suggests that credit default swaps may reduce 
monitoring oversight, and their use can lead to moral hazard on the part 
of borrowers who are subject to less financial- discipline from their 
lenders. 
28. PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 376. 
29. An interesting question in this regard is whether hedge funds currently require their bank 
counter-parties (i .e., the banks who buy credit insurance protection) to supply them with financial 
inform ation or other ongoing data about the company in question. We are not aware of arrangements of 
this sert currently, but such a strategy would suggest that hedge funds may indeed serve as substitute 
monitors. 
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How often do lenders use credit default swaps to lay off their 
borrower risk, as they did with Enron? Data on the credit default market 
are too spotty to allow confident conclusions, but Enron does not appear 
to have been an isolated example. There are active credit default swap 
markets for many of the largest corporations, and the lenders of these 
corporations are often among the principal buyers. The breadth of the 
market became evident when General Motors' credit rating was 
downgraded in early 2005, which sent shock waves through the credit 
derivative market because of the huge volume of General Motors credit 
derivatives.30 The observations are more suggestive than definitive, but 
they do suggest that diminished bank monitoring may be a downside 
consequence of the burgeoning credit derivative market. 
2.  Incentives to Affirmatively Destroy Value 
In 2004, Tower Automotive (Tower), which supplies truck frames to 
the auto industry, borrowed roughly $580 million under a pair of loans 
arranged by J.P. Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley.3 l  As its financial 
condition deteriorated, Tower began looking for an additional loan to 
improve its cash position. The new loan would have required that 
Tower's existing lenders free up a portion of their collateral and adjust 
the terms of their interest payments. J.P. Morgan and the banks that had 
participated in the earlier loan were willing to make the concessions, on 
the view that the new loan might enable Tower to avert bankruptcy. The 
hedge fund participants, on the other hand, would have none of it, which 
meant no concessions under the existing loans and therefore no new 
loan.32 Two months later, Tower filed for Chapter 1 1  bankruptcy 
protection. 
Why the divergence of views between the banks, who favored 
concessions, and the hedge funds, who chose to play hardball? One can 
imagine a variety of possibilities, including differences in institutional 
culture and the longer term orientation of commercial banks. But one 
widely rumored explanation is that, in addition to their position as 
financers of Tower, the hedge funds also had shorted its stock-that is, 
they borrowed Tower stock and stood to profit if the value of the stock 
declined. "Some bankers," as the Wall Street Journal later reported, 
30. See, e.g , Eduardo Porter, If Detroit Calls, US May Not Replay the Bailout Role, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at CL 
3 L The loan and Tower's decline are described in  Henny Sender, Hedge-Fund Lending to 
Distressed Firms Makes for Gray Rules and Rough Play, WALL ST. l, July 1 8, 2005, at C l .  
32. The credit facility apparently required the unanimous consent of the participants as a 
prerequisite to altering any of its terms. 
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"believe hedge funds triggered the filing to make their short positions 
h 
,,33 
wort more. 
Although the Tower episode involved traditional short selling rather 
than credit derivatives, it illustrates another potential misuse of the credit 
default swap market. As with a short position in a company like Tower, 
a lender that has purchased credit default swaps may have an incentive 
to use its position as a lender to affirmatively destroy value. A hedge 
fund or other lender that will benefit more if the company defaults than 
if it successfully averts default may become, in a sense, a Darth Vader 
monitor. Such lenders have a financial incentive to actively enforce the 
terms of their lending . agreements. But they profit by forcing the 
company to default, even if a default will destroy value, not by helping 
. '  34 to Improve Its governance. 
Because of the secrecy with which hedge funds operate, determining 
the extent of this anti-monitoring behavior is especially difficult.35 Any 
effort to assess the seriousness of the problem is further complicated by 
hedge funds' ability to provide benign explanations for their 
recalcitrance, such as the argument that "their stem stance instills 
financial discipline and doesn't reward unnecessary profiigacy.
,,36 
Despite the difficulty of assessing the frequency of anti-monitoring, the 
point remains: a lender that has purchased a credit derivative may have 
an incentive to use the leverage afforded by its loan to force a default, 
even if the default imposes serious costs and impairs the value of the 
firm. 
33. Sender, supra note 31 , at C3. 
34. The behavior described in this subsection is closely related to recent vote-buying techniques 
employed by hedge funds, a development that achieved notoriety with Perry Corporation's ultimately 
abandoned 2004 effort to ensure that a proposed acquisition of one pharmaceutical company, King, by 
another, Mylan, went through. Perry held a significant stake in King's stock. Hoping to tip the Mylan 
vote in favor of the acquisition, Perry bought Mylan stock and simultaneously shorted the same stock. 
This action gave Perry voting rights in Mylan--despite Perry's having no economic stake in Mylan­
and an incentive to further King' s interests at the expense of Mylan and its shareholders. This new form 
of voting buying is analyzed in Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L 
REv. 775 (2005); David Skeel, Jr., Behind the Hedge, LEG. AFFAIRS, NovlDec 2005, at 28-30; Henry 
T.e. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and Empty Voting: Decoupling of Economic and 
Voting Ownership in Public Companies (ECGI, Law Working Paper No. 56/2006, 2006), available at 
http://papers. ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=874098; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge 
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control (U. of Penn. lnst. For Law and Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=91 9 
881. 
35. As of Fe bruary 2006, most hedge funds were required to register with the SEC, but the 
registration requirement was subsequently struck down' by the Court of Appeals for the D.e. Circuit. 
Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comrn'n., 451 F.3d 873, (D.e. Cir. 2006). Whether the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) or Congress will attempt to find a new basis for requiring hedge fund 
disclosUl;.e is unclear as of this writing. 
36: Sender, supra note 31, at C1 (describing hedge fund response). 
1 036 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 75 
3 .  The Opacity of the Credit Default Market 
The difficulty of determining the pervasiveness of the two concerns 
discussed thus far points to another dark side of credit default swaps. 
The market for credit default swaps is quite opaque. Because swaps are 
structured as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, they are largely 
unregulated. Among other things, this means that the details of 
particular swaps often go undisclosed. Indeed, ISDA has actively 
resisted disclosure of credit default swap documentation, insisting that 
this information is proprietary. Thickening the informational fog still 
further is the frequency with which one of the original parties sells its 
stake to someone else without notifying the other party. "Record­
keeping, documentation and other practices have been so sloppy," as a 
recent article put it, "that no firm could be sure how much risk it was 
taking or with whom it had a deal. ,,37 
This uncertainty can have a variety of undesirable effects. To the 
extent that investors, the market, and other creditors of a company have 
no way of knowing whether a lender has hedged its position with credit 
derivatives, they cannot adjust their behavior accordingly. A bank 
lender's willingness to make concessions means one thing if the bank 
has a major, exposed lending facility with the debtor; it means 
something very different if the bank has hedged its risk with credit 
default swaps. If suppliers, bondholders, or other stakeholders do not 
know whether the bank is hedged, the informational content of the 
bank' s  actions will be muddied.38 This uncertainty is itself an important 
cost of the credit default swap market. The opacity of the market may 
also make it more likely that hedge funds or other parties will 
manipulate default in the ways described in the previous subsection.39 
As noted earlier, some derivatives industry participants recently have 
tried to address some of the infrastructure problems in the credit default 
swaps market. But even after the industry's  intervention, two problems 
remain. First, to the extent investors and the markets still have little 
37.  See Wessel, supra note 1 5, at A2. See also Greg Ip & Carrick Mollenkamp, Us. and Britain 
Team Up to Test Financial Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at C l .  
38. For an argument that investors rely on the informational content of the public issuance of· 
debt, see Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 1. LEGAL. 
STUD. 73 ( 1 993); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. 
ECON. REv. 650 ( 1 984) (signaling value of dividends). As discussed in the text, the opacity of the credit 
default market interferes with the information content of bank oversight or lack thereof. 
39.  The lack of transparency, together with the dearth of regulation, may also invite other forms 
of misbehavior, such as insider trading in credit default swaps. For evidence suggesting the possibility 
of insider trading, see, e.g., Kara Scannell et aI., Can Anyone Police the Swaps?, WALL ST. J ., Aug. 3 1 , 
2006, at C 1 (describing upward spikes in price prior to acquisitions). 
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information about the credit default activities of particular parties, the 
informational content of a bank's or other lender's interactions with the 
debtor will remain unclear. The second concern is a downside of 
industry self-regulation, a concern that warrants a brief, separate 
discussion. 
4. The Downside of Self-Regulation: Industry Self-Protection 
Although industry self-regulation has a great deal to recommend it, it 
has important downsides.4o Most stem from the fact that the industry's  
regulatory efforts will inevitably further the self-interest of the major 
industry players. To the extent that industry self-interest and social 
welfare are aligned, the role of industry players is unproblematic. The 
rapid standardization of credit default swaps may benefit existing market 
makers by increasing the volume of their credit default swaps practice, 
for instance, but the reduction ' in transaction costs also benefits other 
parties. 
But the leading firms also may attempt to protect their own interests 
even when doing so undermines the efficiency of the market as a whole. 
In particular, there are concerns that ISDA, the derivatives industry trade 
group, will develop standardized documentation and approaches that 
benefit ISDA members at the expense of others, either because they 
redistribute resources among parties, create or take advantage of 
informational asymmetries, or create negative externalities .4 1  Similarly, 
the major market makers may have a disincentive to promote broad 
disclosure, since such disclosure would diminish the value of their 
specialized knowledge of the credit default swaps market. 
The Second Circuit's  2002 decision in Caiola v. Citibank illustrates 
some of the concerns about standardized derivatives documentation.42 
In 1994, Citibank proposed to a long-time client, Louis Caiola, an 
investment strategy involving "synthetic" trading of stocks and options. 
Instead of actually buying particular stocks and options, Caiola entered 
into an ISDA Master Agreement with Citibank, which agreed to pay 
Caiola the economic returns of those instruments in exchange for · an 
40. The benefits and l imitations of industry self-regulation are discussed in· detail in the corporate 
takeover context in John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, 
and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of us and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2007), available at http://papers.ssm .com/soI3/papers.cfrn?abstracUd=928928 (contrasting self­
regulation in UK to court- and rule-based US approach). 
4 1 .  See Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives 
Regulation, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 2 1 3. (Robert E. Litan & Richard 
Herring eds, ,_-2002). 
42 . Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 3 1 2  (2d Cir. 2002). 
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agreed periodic payment. Caiola and Citibank also executed a 
confirmation for each synthetic transaction. Caiola's trading was 
substantial, and in 1998 his synthetic trades equaled 25% of the total 
worldwide volume in Philip Morris stock options. 
Initially, Citibank hedged its risks by trading stocks, but it later 
switched to hedging with options. A few months later, Citibank refused 
to allow Caiola to continue trading in Philip Morris options. Caiola 
alleged that he lost money when Citibank switched to options hedging, 
and that he was unable to hedge his own losses (tens of millions of 
dollars) when Citibank terminated his trading. 
The Caiola case presented an issue of first impression concerning 
whether the parties, by labeling a transaction a "synthetic stock trade," 
could opt out of the coverage of the securities laws. The district court 
relied extensively on the parties' representations in the ISDA documents 
and confirmations for the transactions. In those confirmations, Caiola 
acknowledged that he was not relying on any advice from Citibank, that 
he had the independent ability to evaluate the transaction and its risks, 
that Citibank was not his fiduciary, and that the transaction would not be 
registered under the securities laws. Based on these representations, the 
district court ruled that the synthetic transactions were not securities and 
that Citibank had not violated the securities laws. 
The Second Circuit reversed this ruling on appeal. The appellate 
court focused on the question of whether the signed disclaimers 
specifically related to the risks at issue. It found that the disclaimers 
were too generic. In other words, the court found that because of the 
information and sophistication asymmetry between the parties, the party 
with the negotiating advantage was required to disclaim risks more 
specifically. 
It is unclear how far Caiola will extend. Just as the common law of 
contract has evolved to include exceptions (e.g., implied contractual 
terms, fiduciary duties, unconscionability) to the general rule that courts 
will enforce the clear intentions of the parties, judges interpreting ISDA 
provisions might make similar exceptions. However, most industry 
participants doubt that judges will do much to· police financial services 
industry self-regulation, and cases involving OTC derivatives suits are 
rare.43 
43 . Of particular significance in such cases would be evidence of any substantial information or 
sophistication gap between the parties, especially if such a gap generated a degree of trust in the 
relationship between the parties. There is an extensive body of law that refuses to treat contracts of 
adhesion or standard form contracts like other negotiated contracts. See JOHN D. CALAMARJ & JOSEPH 
M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 3 82-92 (4th ed. 1 998). 
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Although standard form derivatives documentation clearly can be cost 
reducing, and theoretically could evolve to provide more appropriate 
terms, ISDA's virtual monopoly on the creation .of legal rules might be 
problematic. If a few major dealers control ISDA documents, those 
agreements might be written either with dealer -to-dealer contracts in 
mind (and therefore might not be appropriate for -contracts between a 
dealer and an end-user such as Caiola), or might be constructed to 
advantage dealers in dealer-to-end-user contracts. 
The leadership of ISDA does appear to be dominated by a small 
number of major dealers. In contrast, end-users of derivatives are much 
more numerous and diffuse, and therefore face collective action 
problems in creating a plausible set of alternative legal rules. Moreover, 
end-users are not entitled to vote on ISDA decisions, and do not have 
any substantial role in formulating legal rules. 
Nevertheless, even given ISDA's domination, individual dealers have 
incentives to compete for derivatives business, and if end-users value 
particular contract provisions, individual dealers can capture-business -by 
amending their forms. Derivatives markets are large and transactions 
costs are relatively low, so that even if the legal rules were fixed and 
non-negotiable, dealers and end-users still could negotiate based on 
price. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the key provisions of 
derivatives contracts are rarely negotiated, and that the types of 
representations appearing in the Caiola-Citibank contract pervade ISDA 
documents regardless of the relative sophistication and bargaining pO-we:r 
of the parties. If representation-related contract terms are not priced, a 
monopoly in ex ante specification of legal rules could generate 
additional profits for the dealers who create those rules. Moreover, 
terms appropriate for dealer-to-dealer transactions might not be 
appropriate for dealer-to-end-user transactions. 
In the context of credit derivatives, counter-parties also might use 
ambiguous terms to their advantage. For example, what is the meaning 
of the term "restructuring"? If payment on a credit derivatives contract 
is to be made upon an event of "restructuring," a sophisticated counter­
party might argue that the event had been triggered ' with 'respect to 
payments counter -parties owed to it, but not with respect to payments it 
d 
. 44 owe to counter-partIes. 
44. For example, this issue arose in litigation related to credit derivatives based on debt issued by 
the government of Argentina. See Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of 
New York, 3:-75 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing definition of credit event related to Argentine 
government bonds). 
�I-
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5 .  Systemic Risk in the Credit Default Swaps Market 
Credit default swaps also raise systemic concerns. Because many 
investors-particularly hedge fund investors-place highly leveraged 
bets on credit default swaps, even a relatively small market change could 
trigger a crisis of the sort that . Long Tenn Capital Management 
threatened to unleash when it collapsed in 1998.45 The rush to unwind a 
vast array of interconnected contracts could create serious liquidity 
problems in the financial markets. Given the size of the market, a crisis 
involving credit derivatives would cause convulsions throughout the 
international financial markets. Thus, although credit default swaps can 
diminish systemic risk, as we saw in the last Part, the market also has the 
potential to cause precisely the opposite effect. 
B. The Downs ides ojeDO 's 
Although CDOs appear to create value for investors, they also present 
potential problems. Many of the problems of CDOs are similar to those 
of credit default swaps. To the extent CDO special purpose entities, 
rather than banks, hold bonds and loans, there are further reductions in 
the incentives of banks to play their traditional monitoring function.46 
Moreover, hedge funds and other sophisticated investors have incentives 
to manipulate the pricing and structuring of CDOs, and some studies 
suggest that CDO managers manipulate collateral in order to shift risks 
among the various tranches.47 CDOs also are an opaque market that is 
dominated by a handful of interests. And CDOs pose systemic risks, 
including the risk that a default on one or more bonds would generate a 
ripple effect of defaults in CDOS.48 
Rather than repeat the above arguments with respect to CDOs, we 
simply note that they apply with equal or greater force, and instead focus 
on a potential problem that is unique to CDOs: the costly mispricing of 
credit. The transaction costs associated with CDOs are very high, and 
there is reason to believe that the potential benefits of CDOs, described 
45 . The LTCM debacle is chronicled in P ARTNOY, supra note 2, at 2 5 1 �2 .  
46 .  These effects can be counteracted to some extent b y  requiring a bank-such a s  the 
investment bank that creates the CDO-to hold a stake in the junior tranche. But this approach is still 
likely to lead to substantially less monitoring than under a traditional bank loan. 
47. See Kendran Garrison, Manager Incentives in Collateralized Debt Obligations. 6 (Aug. 1 5 ,  
2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http ://papers.ssm. comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=72048. 
48. Such an event nearly occurred when WaddCom defaulted on its obligations; a majority of 
CDOs contained WoridCom bonds at the time, and WoridCom bonds made up an average of 1 .2% of 
synthetic CDOs. See PARTNOY, supra note 2. 
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in Part II, are not rea1.49 
At the outset, we note the apparent value created by CDOs is in some 
tension with basic economic theory. The Law of One Price suggests that 
similar assets should have similar values. 50 If they did not, someone 
would buy low, sell high, and earn a riskless profit. If a bank can make 
money repackaging corporate debt through a CDO, it must mean there' 
are inefficiencies in the corporate debt market. But if some of the debt 
in the portfolio is mispriced, market participants should take advantage 
of this mispricing directly, by buying and selling bonds-and earning 
arbitrage profits-until prices are accurate. 
There are some restrictions on selling short bonds or credit default 
swaps but, at least with respect to credit default swaps, they are not as 
onerous as those that have been imposed, for example, on selling stocks. 
Regulatory arbitrage might explain some of the activity in cash flow 
CDOs, where parties take advantage of the reduction in net capital 
requirements from holding highly-rated CDO tranches instead of the 
underlying bonds. But regulatory arbitrage cannot explain the growth of 
synthetic CDOs because the underlying credit default swaps do not have 
the same regulatory costs as actual bonds.
5 1  
Investors who want to own diversified portfolios of fixed income 
assets are not prohibited from doing so. Moreover, if markets were 
segmented by risk, one would expect market pressure to lead 
corporations that issue bonds to create capital structures that would be 
most attractive to particular market segments. Corporate bonds are not 
like home mortgages, which typically cannot be purchased individually 
or even in diversified classes. Economists know that arbitrage 
opportunities rarely persist absent a dominant information asymmetry or 
regulatory explanation. The purchasers of CDO tranches typically are 
sophisticated and the regulatory rationales do not apply to synthetic 
CDOs. Moreover, the cost of this so-called "arbitrage" is enormous: if a 
trillion dollars of CDOs have been sold, financial intermediaries have 
earned billions of dollars in fees. 
It seems likely that because the methodologies used for rating CDOs 
are complex, arbitrary, and opaque, they create opportunities for parties 
to create a ratings "arbitrage" opportunity without adding any actual 
value. Though difficult to test, this view rests on persuasive reasoning. 
Essentially, the argument is that once the rating agencies fix a given set 
49. This discussion is drawn from Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 1 7 .  
5 0 .  For discussion o f  the Law o f  One Price, see, e.g. , FRANKLIN ALLEN, RICHARD A. BREALEY, 
& STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (8th .ed .. 2006). 
51". ' As noted earlier, see supra note 22, synthetic CDO's are not subject to the capital rules that 
influence bank investment decisions with respect to actual bonds. 
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of fonnulas and variables for rating CDOs, financial market participants 
will be able to find a set of fixed income assets that, when run through 
the relevant models, generate a CDO whose tranches are more valuable 
than the underlying assets. Such a result might be due to errors in rating 
the assets themselves (i.e., the assets are cheap relative to their ratings), 
errors in calculating the relationship between those assets and the 
tranche payouts (i.e., the correlation and expected payout of the assets 
appear to be higher and therefore support higher ratings of tranches}, or 
errors in rating the individual CDO tranches (i.e., the tranches receive a 
higher rating than they deserve, given the ratings of the underlying 
assets).52 
Although the mathematic techniques of CDO technology are 
sophisticated, they are subject to the limitations of "garbage in, garbage 
out." For example, S&P calculates a probability distribution of default 
rates for a portfolio, and then calculates a set of Scenario Default Rates 
(SDRs) in two steps.53 First, for a given tranche to receive a particular 
rating, the probability of defaults in its portfolio exceeding the portfolio 
default rate cannot exceed the default rate for a corporate bond with that 
rating. Second, S&P multiplies the portfolio default rate by an 
adjustment factor depending on the tranche. This is basically an error 
factor that in S&P's  judgment should adjust for the fact that actual 
defaults might be higher or lower. 
Recovery rates and recovery timing for assets vary depending on the 
nature of the asset, particularly its seniority. This is far from an exact 
science-recovery times vary by jurisdiction, legal framework, and 
debtor ' s  rights-and rarely does historical evidence of default rates for 
particular assets (especially rated assets) exist. Yet the assumed 
recovery inputs the rating agencies use necessarily must be precise ones. 
The default probabilities S&P uses in its models are fixed, based on 
default probability estimates within a given rating category. S&P has 
published assumptions about default rates to be used in certain CDO 
calculations, as set forth in the chart below. 54 
52. The rating agencies are sensitive to these arguments. As S&P has described the CDO 
process, "This is not alchemy or turping straw into gold, but rather the implementation of structured 
finance to create different investment risk profiles, based on the structuring of credit support." See 
Synthetic CDO Criteria, supra note 1 9, at 14 .  
5 3 .  Sten Bergman, CDO Evaluator Applies Correlation and Monte Carlo Simulation to the Art 
of Determining Portfolio Quality, STANDARD & POOR 'S, Nov. 1 3 ,  200 1 ,  
http://www2.standardandpoors. com/serv letiS atell ite ?pagename=sp/sp _ articl e/ ArticleTemp late&c=sp _ ar 
ticle&cid= 1 047394478790&I=ENG. 
54. Id 
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S&P Default Rate Assumptions for CDOs 
ABS (all) Com Year 4 Com Year 7 Com Year 1 0  
AAA 0.25% 0. 1 9% 0.52% 0 .99% 
AA 0 .50% 0.57% 1 .20% 1 .99% 
A 1 .00% 0 . 8 1 %  1 . 8 1 % 3 .04% 
BBB 2 .00% 1 . 8 1 %  3 .94% 6 .08% 
BB 8 . 00% 9.49% 1 4 .20% 1 7 .47% 
B 1 6 .00% 2 1 .45% 26. 1 5% 28 .45% 
If a CDO manager were able to purchase assets within a particular 
rating category at market prices that implied a higher default rate than 
the one suggested in the above table, the manager could create an 
"arbitrage" profit by achieving a higher rating. 55 To the extent 
purchasers of CDO tranches care primarily about ratings and yields, 
rather than the analysis of the actual default probability of the assets, the 
CDO would add value. Importantly, the agencies rate bonds within a 
particular rating category, say AAA, even though market prices imply 
different probabilities of default. They permit CDO managers to assume 
that the rating agencies' assumptions, not the market 's implicit 
assumptions, are the relevant ones when evaluating the tranches of 
CDOs. Put another way, credit rating agencies are providing the 
markets with an opportunity to arbitrage the credit rating agencies' 
mistakes (or, more generously, the fact that rating categories cover a 
broad range of default probabilities, rather than a point estimate). 
The problems with how CDO pricing models incorporate various 
measures of correlation among assets are even more troubling. Clearly, 
the ratings of CDO tranches should be sensitive to the correlation of the 
underlying assets. Yet even as late as 2002, S&P's correlation inputs for 
corporate assets were simply 0.3 within a given industry and 0.0 
between industry sectors. The correlation inputs for . asset backed 
securities were similar. S&P recognized that these inputs were flawed, 
55.  For example, if S&P assumes, as the above chart suggests, that the default rate on BBB -rated 
bonds for four years generally is 1 . 8 1  %, one could generate an arbitrage profit by finding BBB-rated 
bonds whose market prices implied a much higher default probability (i .e.,  BBB-rated bonds that were 
cheap), and then taking advantage of the fact that the CDO tranches based on those bonds would be 
rated on the assumption that the default rate was 1 . 8 1  %. A resulting CDO tranch might be rated AAA, 
based'"on S&P's assumptions, and therefore be a cheap AAA investment relative to other AAA-rated 
instruments that were priced based on the market's perception of actual default probabilities. 
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but used them nonetheless. 56 The Bank for International Settlements 
also has expressed concerns about this kind of model risk, particularly 
with respect to correlation. 57 
Perhaps surprisingly, it is the investment bank structuring the CDO­
not the rating agency-that typically performs these complex 
calculations. 58 The process of rating CDOs becomes a mathematical 
game that smart bankers know they can win. A person who understands 
the details of the model can tweak the inputs, assumptions, and 
underlying assets to produce a CDO that appears to add value, even 
though in reality it does not. 
The mathematical precision of the models is illusory because 
numerous subjective factors enter the process as well. For example, the 
rating agency evaluates the CDO asset manager, who has discretion to 
engage in trading. CDOs typically are not fully funded when they are 
first rated; instead, the manager has a set of parameters governing which 
assets it is permitted to buy or sell. There also are difficult questions 
about the documentation of CDOs, as well as record and reporting 
requirements, which are not yet standardized. 59 
Even if these difficulties could be surmounted, consider the 
complexities associated with so-called "CDO Squared" transactions, the 
assets of which consist of a reference portfolio of other CDOs and asset­
backed securities (or, less commonly, "CDO Cubed" transactions, 
whose assets consist of a portfolio of CDO Squareds).60 Again, the 
56. See Synthetic CDO Criteria, supra note 1 9, at 46 ("As data becomes available, the 
correlation coefficients will be modified based on documented studies."). 
57. See The Role of Ratings in Structured Finance: Issues and Implications, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Jan. 2005, http://www .bis.orglpubllcgfs23 .htm. Some credit rating 
agency officials have echoed those concerns. See BIS Vindicates AgenCies. But Warns on Ratings 
Limitations, Correlation Risk, STRUCTURED FINANCE INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 1 , 2005,  at 56, 5 6  (quoting 
the head of CDOs at S&P in London as saying, ''I 'm not sure correlation risk has been fully understood 
by anyone. We try to be very clear to the market about what our assumptions' are and how our models 
work."). 
58 .  For example, S&P states that 
[t]he transaction's sponsor or banker will generally perform the cash flow modeling and 
provide Standard & Poor's with the results and the model. The sponsor or the banker 
doing the cash flow modeling must also provide to Standard & Poor's an independent­
accountant verification that the proprietary cash flow model is representative of the 
transaction structure, and that the dominant cash flow run results are as indicated by the 
party doing the modeling. 
See SynthetiC CDO Criteria, supra note 1 9, at 1 7- 1 8 .  
5 9 .  Additional complications arise with what are known as leveraged super senior notes, which 
are, essentially, tranches above the AAA-rated notes that take the last loss in a CDO transaction. 
60. The ostensible benefit of a "CDO Squared" or "CDO Cubed" transaction is that it creates 
highly rated tranches of securities with yields that are more attractive than comparably-rated 
investments. It is unclear whether the purchasers of these securities understand the source of these 
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models require assumptions about all of the variables stated above, but 
this time accreted to a second (or third) level, with respect to the 
underlying CDOs, in addition to the underlying assets of those CDOs. 
Moreover, although a typical CDO Squared transaction might involve 
1,000 corporate names,6 1 there are only about 400 issuers of liquid 
corporate bonds. That means certain names must appear more than 
once. According to S&P, each corporate name appears in such 
. 
4 1 7 · 62 transactIOns, on average, . tunes. 
Given these complexities, why do parties purchase CDO tranches? If 
the problem is that bonds are mispriced, one would expect the bond or 
credit default swap market to resolve that problem, or at minimum 
provide lower cost opportunities to arbitrage such mispricing than high­
fee CDOs would provide. If the problem is that bond purchasers and 
issuers are in different market segments, one would expect issuers to 
take advantage of potential arbitrage opportunities by adjusting their 
capital structure or leverage, or both, to attract neglected segments of the 
market. Yet little evidence exists that COOs are used to create new 
assets with underrepresented credit ratings; instead, the ratings of CDO 
tranches span the same range as those of corporate bonds. 
If the mathematical models have serious lirnitations,63 how could they 
support a multi-trillion-dollar market? Some experts have suggested 
that CDO structurers manipulate models and the underlying portfolio in 
order to generate the most attractive ratings profile for a CDO. For 
example, parties included the bonds of General Motors and Ford in 
CDOs before they were downgraded because the bonds were cheap 
relative to their (then high) ratings.64 The primary reason the 
above-market yields. 
6 1 .  Drill-Down Approach for Synthetic CDO Squared Transactions, STRUCTURED FINANCE 
(Standard & Poor's) Dec. 1 0, 2003, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.comlspf/ 
pdf/fixedincome/1 2 1 003 _ cdosquared. pdf. 
62. Id. 
63.  Recent research in finance shows that asset pricing models of the variety used by credit 
rating agencies fail to explain real world data. See Nikola A. Tarashev, An Empirical Evaluation of 
Structural Credit Risk Models (BlS Working Paper No. 1 79, July 2005), available at 
http://www.bis.orgipubVwork I 79.pdf. For example, observed market spreads typically are much higher 
than those predicted by structural models, especially at the high quality end of the rating spectrum. See 
Til Shuermann, A Review of Recent Books on Credit Risk, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK. OF NEW YORK 
(Sept. 2004) (citing numerous studies). These studies suggest that there are significant non-credit 
components to spreads on fixed-income instruments. Moreover, such models fail  to take into account 
tail risk, and are based on historical measures, which often are not good predictors. One would think 
that the collapses of firms such as Long-Term Capital Management and Askin Capital Management 
would have been sufficient warning to entities attempting to engage in arbitrage based on such models. 
See also Mark Whitehouse, How a Formula Ignited Market that Burned Some Big Investors, WALL ST. 
1., Sept. 12 , 2605, at A I .  
64. Likewise, more than three-fourths o f  the pre-2002 CDOs S&P rated in the United States 
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downgrades of those companies had an unexpectedly large market 
impact was that they were held by so many CDOS.65 
In sum, CDOs present not only the numerous risks associated with 
credit default swaps, but also the risk that parties are spending billions of 
dollars in fees to buy mispriced debt. The potential market 
inefficiencies are substantial, given the size of the CDO market and the 
magnitude of CDO fees. There are two possibilities: either CDOs are 
being used to arbitrage a substantial price discrepancy in the' fixed 
income markets or CDOs are being used to convert existing fixed 
income instruments that are priced accurately into new fixed income 
instruments that are overvalued. The first possibility assumes the 
existence of a substantial market inefficiency, perhaps the most 
substantial inefficiency ever found in the finance literature. The second 
possibility seems more likely. In other words, CDOs either are evidence 
of a substantial and pervasive market imperfection, or they are being 
used to create one. In the next section, we examine potential reforms, 
including suggestions for reducing the market distortions associated with 
CDOs. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET ADmSTMENT OR 
REGULATORY REFORM 
In this Part, we sketch some preliminary ideas regarding reforms that 
might resolve some of the costs and risks associated with credit 
derivatives. We focus on three primary areas of reform: disclosure, 
credit ratings, and non-debtor termination rights in bankruptcy. 
A. Disclosure 
We believe disclosure with respect to both credit default swaps and 
CDOs should improve, although we are agnostic as to whether improved 
disclosure requires government intervention. In general, credit 
derivatives have been largely unregulated, and fall within the statutory 
exemptions from securities law that apply to over-the-counter 
contained W orIdCom bonds, representing an average of more than one percent of the assets of synthetic 
CDOs. See Jenny Wiggins, Growth a/Structured Finance Sector Set to Slow, FIN. TIMES, July 1 , 2002, 
at 26.  Representatives of Moody's  have stated that 5 8  of the synthetic CDOs it rated had exposure to 
World Com. See Rebecca Bream, Moody 's Expects Pressure on CDOs, FIN. TIMES, July 1 0 , 2002, at 3 1 .  
65.  See Henny Sender, Carrick Mollenkamp & MichaeI Mackenzie, Risky Strategies Take Toll 
on Traders, WALL ST. J . ,  May 1 1 , 2005, at C6 (quoting Janet Tavakoli, a prominent structured finance 
expert, as suggesting that "managers often game the portfolio"). 
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derivatives generaUy.66 Although we believe there are strong policy 
arguments that credit derivatives should be subject to the same 
substantive regulation as other economically equivalent instruments, 
such as bonds and loans, we recognize that such changes are unlikely as 
a polit�cal matter. Nevertheless, as a quid pro quo for the continuing 
unregulated status of credit derivatives, we believe it is reasonable to 
request that private parties make additional voluntary disclosures. 
Specifically, we believe public disclosures should include the following. 
First, ISDA should make all credit derivatives documentation 
available for free on the Internet. ISDA currently has a monopoly on 
credit derivatives documentation, and market participants must pay fees 
for documents. ISDA suggests that it has copyrights to these documents 
and that it will enforce its intellectual property rights. It should abandon 
those positions and practices. 
Second, market participants should be required to register credit 
derivatives transactions by · publishing the documentation for their 
transactions through a service such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission's (SEC) Edgar service.67 As a preliminary matter, it would 
be helpful if even a few market participants would publish 
documentation for their transactions with an online service such as 
Findlaw, which currently publishes sample transaction documents in 
other areas (e.g., stock purchase agreements).68 
Third, although some price transparency is present in certain 
segments of the credit default swap market, we believe there should be a 
centralized pricing service for credit derivatives generally. The broker 
services that deal in credit default swaps could easily make historical 
prices available to the public. Moreover, Moody's  and S&P publish 
other data regarding CDOs on their websites.69 
Fourth, companies that already are reporting companies should be 
required to include descriptions of the effects of credit derivatives, not 
only in footnote disclosure, but in narrative form in the management's 
discussion and analysis of results and operations sections of their 
financial filings. Specifically, companies should be required to disclose 
the effect of credit derivatives transactions on their risk exposure. For 
66. For discussion of over-the-counter derivatives and their regulatory treatment, see, e.g. , Karen 
P. Ramdhanie, Derivatives Contracts of Insolvent Companies: Preferred Treatment Under the 
Bankruptcy Code of the United States and the Insolvency Laws of the United Kingdom, 1 8  N. Y.L. SCH. 
J. !NT'L & COtvlP. L. 269, 272 n.28 ( 1999) . 
67. See http://www.sec.gov. 
68. See http:www.findlaw.com. 
6i· ·See Moody's, http://www.moodys.com (last visited Feb. 1 6, 2007); Standard & Poor's, 
http://www .standardandpoors.com (last visited Feb. 1 6, 2007). 
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example, a bank might disclose the nature of its lending exposure based 
on its use of credit default swaps to hedge. To the extent companies are 
not disclosing this information, the SEC ·· might require · it through 
rulemaking. 
B. Credit Ratings 
One of us has written extensively about potential reforms in the credit 
rating industry.7o We will not rehash those writings here, except to note 
that, with respect to credit derivatives, we believe opening credit ratings 
to competition should resolve some of the problems. Specifically, an 
approach such as that embodied in H.R. 2990, the Credit Rating Agency 
Duopoly Relief Act of 2005 , could increase competition by eliminating 
the SEC's role in recognizing approved credit rating agencies, and 
substituting a registration requirement.7 l  
In addition, we believe companies should be required to explain their 
investment policy with respect to credit ratings. Both S&P and Moody' s 
state explicitly that ratings are not recommendations to buy and should 
not be the basis of investment decisions. We believe institutional 
investors, particularly fiduciaries, should describe the extent to which 
they rely on credit ratings in making investment decisions or for other 
purposes. In making the additional disclosures described above, 
institutional investors also should describe the extent to which credit 
ratings are relevant to their decision to use credit default swaps or 
CDOs. They should describe whether their internal assessments of the 
credit quality and risks of CDO tranches they buy are consistent with the 
credit ratings of those instruments. 
C. Automatic Stay and Termination Rights in Bankruptcy 
The non-debtor counter-party to a derivative or related financial 
instrument enjoys extraordinary privileges if its counter-party files for 
bankruptcy . Absent special protection, the derivative would be subject 
to bankruptcy's automatic stay, which prohibits non-debtors from taking 
any action to enforce an obligation against the debtor without court 
approval.72 Bankruptcy also prevents most non-debtors from invoking 
70. See, e.g.. Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers. supra note 1 7 . 
7 1 .  See H.R. REp. No. 1 09-2990 (2005) (substituting a system of Nationally Registered 
Statistical Rating Organizations for the current SEC recognition requirement). 
72.  The derivative would qualify as property of the estate under 1 1  V.S.C.A. § 54 1 (a) (2005), 
and § 362(a) imposes a stay on any effort to exert control over property of the estate. 1 1  V.S.C.A. 
§ 362(a) (2005). 
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ipso facto clauses-provisions that make bankruptcy a condition of 
default under the parties' contract.73 Derivatives are given special 
treatment in both of these areas.74 Unlike other non-debtors, the non­
debtor participants in derivatives contracts are permitted to enforce their 
rights without interference from the bankruptcy process, due to a 
perception that if enforcement were delayed, the collapse of an 
important player in the derivatives markets could have a contagious 
effect throughout the financial markets.75 The 2005 amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code extended the special treatment by, among other things, 
expanding the range of financial instruments that qualify.76 The 
question for our purposes is whether the special treatment is justified. 
The first thing to note is that the standard explanation for the special 
treatment is not particularly compelling. It is far from clear that the 
exception reduces systemic risk; it may even increase this risk because it 
eliminates a possible curb on counter-parties' rush to close out their 
contracts in the event of a wave of failures.77 
A more persuasive rationale is that it is unnecessary to . impose the 
automatic stay on, and delay enforcement of, derivatives contracts. The 
stay, as traditionally conceived, enables the debtor to keep assets 
together in order to preserve their going concern value for a 
reorganization or sale. Because derivatives are fungible financial 
instruments-more like cash than essential equipment or property­
preventing a counter-party from exercising its rights is unnecessary. 
"No harm, no foul," the reasoning goes.78 . 
Although this reasoning is much more compelling than the standard 
justification for special treatment, there are important countervailing 
73.  See 1 1  U.S.CA § §  54 1 (c)( I ) , 3 65(e) (2005). 
74. 1 1  U.S.CA § 3 62(b)(6}--(7) (2005) (permitting setoff and closing out of derivatives 
contraCts); id at § 555 (excepting "securities contracts" from prohibition against enforcement of ipso 
facto clauses); id at § 556  (excepting forward and commodities contracts) ; id at § 559  (repos); id at 
§ 560 (swaps); id at § 5 6 1  (master netting agreements). 
75. See, e.g., H.R. REp. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1 982) (exception needed to prevent the "insolvency of 
one commodity or security firm from spreading to other firms and possibly threatening the collapse of 
the affected market"). 
76. Among other things, the amendments expanded the definition of "swap" to include both 
parties to nearly every conceivable derivatives contract. The amendments also explicitly added credit 
derivatives to the definition. I I  U.S.CA. § 1 0 1 (5 3B) (2005). For overviews of the 2005 amendments, 
see, e.g. , Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 Bus. L. 1 5 07 (2005); Edward R. Morrison & 
Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt 
Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges (Colum. L .& Econ., Working Paper No. 29 1 ,  Jan. 2 5 ,  2006), available 
at http://ssm.comlabstract=878328.  
77.  This problem with the traditional explanation is discussed in detail in Franklin R. Edwards & 
Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment:>, 22 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1 0 1 ,  1(}7. 1 09 (2005). 
78. ld (making each of these points). 
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considerations with respect to at least some derivatives-particularly 
credit default swaps. For a company that has auto manufacturers as its 
major clients and that has purchased a credit default swap protecting it 
against a downgrade of one or more of the manufacturers, for instance, 
the swap is quite similar to an insurance policy.79 Insurers are generally 
prevented from terminating an insurance policy when a company files 
for bankruptcy, and it is not obvious that credit derivatives that serve a 
similar function should be treated differently.80 This is especially so 
given the incentive a counter-party may have to terminate a credit 
derivative strategically. If bankruptcy is a basis for termination of a 
credit derivative and the value of the derivative has increased (because 
the likelihood of issuer default or downgrade has increased), the 
counter-party may terminate, making it much more expensive for the 
debtor to enter a new hedging contract. 
The risk of strategic termination suggests that there are real costs to 
simply leaving the parties to derivatives to their own devices. At the 
least, we believe that counter-parties to credit derivatives should not be 
permitted to invoke ipso facto clauses. 8 l  More generally, our analysis 
suggests that the blanket exception for derivatives should be rethought. 
Although a more fine-grained approach that applied the automatic stay 
to some derivatives, such as those designed for insurance purposes, 
would complicate the treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy, we believe 
that a more nuanced approach is preferable to adopting a blanket rule 
that invites strategic termination by non-debtors.82 The costs of 
excluding every derivative from the ordinary protections of bankruptcy 
are likely to rise, moreover, as companies increasingly tum to 
derivatives as a substitute for traditional forms of insurance . 
79. Similar to, but not identical. Unlike with a standard insurance policy, for instance, the 
protection seller under a credit default swap does not fully step into the shoes of the protection buyer. I f  
the buyer is a bank that has lent money t o  the debtor, the bank continues t o  retain its rights under the 
loan itself. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between a credit default swap and a 
standard insurance policy, see Lubben, supra note 27, at 2 8-33. 
80. The courts that prohibit an insurer from terminating treat the policy as property of the estate 
and hold that termination would therefore violate the automatic stay. See, e.g. Cahokia Downs, Inc. et 
al. v. Sp0!1service, Inc. (In re Cahoki Downs, Inc.), 5 B .  R .  529 (Bankr. S .D.  I ll. 1980). 
81. For a similar concern about special treatment in bankruptcy, see Vasser, supra note 76, at 
1542 (noting that "only the non-debtor counterparty obtains the upside of a derivative in a bankruptcy, 
not the debtor"). 
82. We part ways here with the conclusions of an excellent new article by Ed Morrison and Joerg 
Riegel. Morrison and Riegel defend the Code's blanket approach as preferable to attempting to more 
carefully distinguish between derivatives for which the stay may be necessary, and those for which it is 
not. Morrison & Riegel, supra note 76, at 2 8-29. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Sweeping new regulatory intervention in the credit derivatives market 
does not seem either likely or desirable. While we are less sanguine 
than Alan Greenspan that the market can be expected to regulate itself, 
regulators would do better by tweaking the market in some of the ways 
we have just discussed, than by attempting to intervene in a more 
aggressive fashion. 
In our view, the future of credit derivatives lies in the innovative use 
of these new contracts by the parties themselves. Now that it is possible 
to carefully calibrate risk exposure, for instance, there may be room for 
non-bank financial institutions to narrowly specialize in the monitoring 
and credit risk assessment roles that traditionally have been played by 
banks. Such institutions-most likely hedge funds or debt-focused 
analogues to private equity funds-could hedge the interest rate risk 
associated with their lending. operations and focus exclusively on 
monitoring the borrower's default risk. These institutions could 
compete on the turf that has traditionally been occupied by banks by 
separating two of bank's principal functions, bearing interest rate and 
borrower default risks, and focusing on the latter. In effect, such a 
strategy might anticipate the direction in which many major banks are 
evolving, and get there first. 
It is, of course, impossible to predict just how the credit derivatives 
market will develop, and what new innovations it will spawn. But credit 
derivatives already are transforming the landscape of corporate 
goy.emance. Our hope is that this Article will be the first of many 
efforts by legal scholars to integrate this new market into our 
understanding of corporate governance. 
- ,:. 
